Consolidating investment policy through the Most Favored Nation Clause in International Investment Treaties

Authors

  • Carlos Riquelme Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano

Abstract

The Most Favored Nation Clause has attracted much attention in the international investment regime in the past years. The debate has centered on whether such regulation allows the attraction of more favorable conditions regarding the resolution of controversies. This paper moves away from this debate to analyze another problem that has gained much less attention: the possibility that, through said clause, more favorable conditions included in previously signed treaties are attracted. This possibility is of great interest since it could hinder the modification of the investment attraction policies of the States as expressed in their investment treaties. If eventual shifts in the development strategy are desirable, the clause constitutes an obstacle that should be thoroughly examined.

Keywords:

Most Favored Nation Clause, Foreign Investment, Development Policy, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Multilateralism

Author Biography

Carlos Riquelme, Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano

Abogado, Universidad de Chile. Postítulo en Economía y Finanzas para Abogados de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile. L. L. M. en International Law, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg y Universidad de Chile. Investigador Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Chile.